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ABSTRACT
It is often argued that states do not have any special obligations towards
economic migrants, and that skills-based selection of migrants is
morally unproblematic. In this paper, I argue that even if one does not
endorse special obligations towards economicmigrants, there are good
reasons to be critical of skills-based selection due to its effect on the
citizens in the country they are migrating to. I introduce the issue of the
impact of migrant selection on domestic populations by considering
Blake’s arguments against racial selection in immigration. He argues
that racial selection is wrong because ‘[…] making a statement of racial
preference in immigration necessarily makes a statement of racial pre-
ference domestically as well’. In this paper, I consider whether a similar
case can bemade against selectingmigrants based on their marketable
skills. I begin with a short overview of skills-based selection and some of
the normative arguments put forward in favour of it, before considering
Blake’s argument. Thereafter, I show how Blake’s example of race differs
significantly from selection based on skills, in part due to the nature of
identification with race and skills. However, I argue that the effects of
skills-based selection on domestic population also need to be consid-
ered in any normative argument proposing suchmigration regulations.
These effects include changes in our evaluations of equality and citizen-
ship, negative impact on the social bases of self-respect, as well as
specific disadvantages for segments of society and a negative effect
on social mobility.
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In the philosophical debate onmigration, there has been some discussion on the fairness of
the selection of high-skilled migrants due to its effects on countries of origin through ‘brain
drains’.1 However, less attention has been paid to how skills-based selection in general
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impacts the countries these migrants are moving to, and how such an impact should affect
an evaluation of the fairness of such policies. In this paper, I address this issue by critically
discussing how skills-based selection affects citizens in countries enacting such regulations.
In short, I argue that skills-based selection is morally problematic due to its effects on parts
of the domestic population. As such, I bracket the question of whether selecting migrants
based on their skills is unfair to the migrants seeking admittance and their country of
origin, and show how it can be unfair to some of the citizens in the country they are
migrating to. This unfairness is due to skills-based selection sending a message of pre-
ference to lower-skilled or working-class citizens, the effect this can have on these citizens’
social bases of self-respect, and the policy’s potential to limit the opportunities for the
domestic population. Before I proceed to the normative discussion, I next give a brief
overview of what is meant by skills-based selection, and some of the arguments put forward
for these kinds of immigration regulations.
What is skills-based selection?
Skills-based selection refers to labour migration regulations that evaluate people accord-
ing to their marketable skills, and give differentiated treatment on the basis of these
evaluations. These kinds of evaluations are increasingly being made, and in more
sophisticated ways, as states attempt to fill gaps in their labour market. For example,
there is an increasing global competition to attract many so-called highly skilled
migrants, such as IT specialists and experienced engineers. Health-care professionals
are also particularly sought after, as an ageing population and increased spending on
health care have increased the need for these workers in many countries in the global
North. Furthermore, as Castles (2006) points out, there is a global trend towards more
guest worker programmes, whereby typically lower-skilled workers are given temporary
and conditional contracts. Finally, the need for unskilled migrants in many countries is
fulfilled by so-called ‘illegal’ migrants, who have no official residency status.
Increasingly then, countries in the global North and global East, such as Canada,
Australia, the UK, Singapore, and Denmark, are systematically differentiating their
treatment of labour migrants, giving preference and beneficial conditions to highly
skilled workers, while either allowing lower-skilled migrants entry subject to certain
restrictions, allowing them in on temporary visas or barring their entry.
Before I proceed, a few points on terminology and scope are in order. It is worth
noting that the definition of skills is highly contentious, and different approaches define
skills in a variety of ways. These definitions can be based on higher education qualifica-
tions, work experience, occupation and/or salary.2 Different countries all have their own
definitions of high-skilled, low-skilled and unskilled. While the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines a persons level of skill on
the basis of years of education, some countries define it according to what types of visas
they are eligible for. The UK has no official definition of what counts as low-skilled, but
it is commonly used about people who do not qualify for Tier 2 working Visas. As these
are given on the basis of projected earnings, low-skilled can therefore, for example, refer
2For an overview of the debate on how skills are defined in immigration policies and the merits of these varying
definitions see Boucher (2019).
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to carers or cleaners.3 Canada on the other hand has several different types of skill levels
(0, A, B, C and D) in its official immigration regulations, wherein managers, profes-
sionals and certain trades are amongst those considered high-skilled, whereas: ‘Skill
Levels C and D occupations include semi- and low-skilled workers in the trades,
primary and manufacturing industries, sales and services, as well as certain clerical
and assistant categories’ (Canada 2019). It therefore seems difficult to conclusively
define what counts as ‘high-skilled’, ‘low-skilled’, ‘unskilled’, or even ‘semi-skilled’.
However, I will for the purpose of this paper consider high-skilled individuals to
typically be higher earners working in sectors such as management, IT, or medicine,
whereas low-skilled refers to lower earners such as carers, cleaners, etc. Finally,
unskilled refers to people without any trade specialization, higher education or personal
wealth.
Although skills-based selection varies from country to country, both in terms of
which factors they consider and the proportion of migrants selected by these systems,
I consider them similar enough to treat them as one type of migration regulation in this
paper.4 When it comes to the scope of the paper, I am primarily referring to skills-based
migration restrictions enacted by countries in the global North, as these are the
countries that have come furthest in instituting these kinds of restrictions. Now it is
worth noting that many countries have migration streams in addition to skills-based
selection, most notably family reunification and refugeehood. However, skills-based
selection is increasingly being adopted and advocated by politicians. Many countries are
also placing restrictions on other migration streams, for example by limiting the
number of refugees they receive and making it harder for people to be reunited with
their families. Skills-based selection is also increasingly being used on other migration
streams. Antje Ellermann traces this development to the rise of human-capital citizen-
ship: ‘As a membership status, human-capital citizenship renders the link between
membership and its benefits conditional and tenuous, transforming rights into earned
privileges’ (Ellermann 2019, 2). This leads to increasing precariousness of many
migrants’ rights, whereby they have to continuously live up to the varying countries
assessment of their skills and economic contribution.
Ayelet Shachar has shown how there has been a paradigm shift in countries’ immigra-
tion regulations from selecting by origin to selecting by skills. Whereas previously most
countries decided who could immigrate to their country based on the nationality of the
person seeking admittance, countries are increasingly using skills-based systems to evaluate
who should be allowed entry. These systems are said to be impartial and fair, as they
3Due to increased earning requirements, however, nurses can also frequently be unqualified for a Tier 2 visas.
(Sumption 2018).
4It is worth noting that ‘merit-based’, ‘needs-based’ and ‘skills-based’ are often used as synonyms in the philosophical
and political debate on migration. All these terms refer to a variety of systems that select immigrants based on such
characteristics as their skills, education, wealth, health or age. In this paper, I use the term skills-based to refer to
these kinds of systems. Furthermore, points-based systems are a mechanism used by some skills-based systems,
which rank migrant’s skills and characteristics according to a mathematical metric, and those who reach a certain
total number of points are eligible to apply for a visa. The skills and characteristics countries use are typically chosen
in order to attract the workers they need, while minimizing the expenditure incurred by these migrants on such
things as health care or language training. Skills-based systems are in place in countries such as Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Singapore, South Africa, Lithuania,
and Romania. (Pottie-Sherman 2013, 558). Countries such as Canada (1967), Australia (1989), New Zealand (1991),
Hong Kong (2006), and South Korea (2018) have implemented points-based systems.
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evaluate all potential migrants according to an objective, impartial and transparent metric,
rather than according to their race, religion, or country they were born in. As Shachar puts
it: ‘Today’s skills-based migration priorities reflect a technocratic, econometric, and man-
agerial logic that aims to bring an air of objectivity (though measures such as the point-
system rubric) into the otherwise deeply charged and politicized terrain of discretionary
immigration’ (Shachar 2016, 183). Having briefly sketched out what is meant by skills-
based selection, I will now move on to discuss some of the normative arguments put
forward for the fairness of these kinds of systems.
The arguments for skills-based migration
Most political philosophers working on immigration do not consider education and skills-
based selection particularly problematic.5 And while most will agree that selection on the
basis of racial grounds is ethically problematic, skills-based selection has not received as
much normative scrutiny.6 It is often taken for granted that states have a right to control
their borders, and as long as they do so in an open and transparent way, the selection
criteria that are used are mostly the prerogative of the countries in question.
In reference to what kinds of immigrations regulations are justifiable, David Miller
refers to legitimate and illegitimate policy goals for states to pursue:
The receiving state has certain policy goals – for example, it is aiming for economic growth
or to provide its citizens with generous welfare services – and it is entitled to use
immigration policy as one of the means to achieve such goals. This explains why selecting
immigrants according to particular skills that they can deploy is a justifiable criterion. […]
In contrast, selection by race or national background is unjustifiable, since these attributes
cannot be linked (except by wholly spurious reasoning) to any goals that a democratic state
might legitimately wish to pursue (Miller 2016, 105-06).
When evaluating what kinds of immigration regulations are morally permissible, Joseph
Carens also argues that selecting immigrants based on their marketable skills is morally
permissible:
As a general matter, this is another criterion that seems morally permissible. To be sure,
the destination country is not acting altruistically in adopting this sort of immigration
policy. It is selecting immigrants on the basis of its perception of the national interest. But
since the country is morally free not to take any immigrants at all from the pool under
consideration here [economic migrants], the fact that it is guided by its own interest in its
selection of some for admission cannot be a decisive objection. Of course, states are equally
free to adopt a more generous policy, taking in those whom they judge to be in greatest
need. That is an admirable course, but it is not morally obligatory (Carens 2013, 108).
It should be noted that Carens primarily argues for open borders, and he is here merely
considering legitimate and illegitimate immigration regulations, given that states are justified
in limiting immigration. In short, both Carens and Miller think skills-based selection is
permissible, given that states can choose those immigrants it is in their interest to receive. And
while they discuss in detail the negative effects of brain drain on the countries of origin and
5For an overview of some of the arguments put forward for education-based selection see Tannock (2011, 1338–39).
6Most also agree that selection on the grounds of religion and gender is illegitimate, whereas political or cultural
background seems to occupy an intermediate position. For example, Miller argues that one can discriminate on
political background if the views held are illiberal or undemocratic (Miller 2016, 107).
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what can be done to limit these negative impacts, they do not pay much attention to the issue
of the potential negative effects of skills-based selection on the citizens in the countries these
migrants are moving to.7 What is important to note in relation to both Miller’s and Carens’
positions, is that they both treat states’ interests as a given, without sufficiently considering the
adverse effects formany citizens in the states enacting the proposed policies. As I argue below,
there is reason to be sceptical of skills-based selection due to the effects on some of the citizens
in states enacting such legislation, and an argument considering legitimate and illegitimate
immigration criteria should address this. Furthermore, like any governmental policy, skills-
based selection is likely to impact citizens to varying degrees. In order to illustrate how
immigration criteria can negatively affect citizens in states enacting such criteria, I turn next
to Blake’s argument against racial restrictions.
Blake’s argument against racial selection
In the philosophical debate on immigration, state-centred approaches often argue that
states only have special obligations to their own citizens, and lesser obligations towards the
people beyond their borders. States therefore have discretionary control over immigration
regulations, as those subject to these regulations have no special claims on the state they
seek to enter. However, the same theorists often argue that selection of immigrants on racial
grounds is unjust, and therefore need to stipulate a basis for why this might be unjust,
which preferably does not refer to those beyond their borders.8 One of the arguments that
bridges this gap and maintains that states have no special obligations towards immigrants,
but that some types of selection of them is wrong, is made by Michael Blake in the article
Discretionary Immigration (2002, 282–89). This argument considers the effects of racial
selection on domestic citizens and argues why racial selection is wrong due to these effects.
Now, while it might initially seem off-putting to justify the wrongs of racial dis-
crimination with reference to its effects on someone other than the person being
discriminated, it is worth noting that just because something is wrong for one reason,
that does not mean it is not also wrong for many other reasons. As mentioned above,
for the purpose of this paper, I bracket the issue of injustices done to migrants seeking
admittance and countries of origin, in order to focus on the effects of skills-based
selection on the citizens of the country enacting these regulations.
In the article ‘Discretionary Immigration’ Blake points out that, if one believes that
states do not have any particular moral responsibility towards prospective discretionary
immigrants, it seems difficult to base the objection to race-based selection on what is
owed to these discretionary immigrants. In other words, if we do not have moral
obligations towards prospective migrants, what makes selection on the basis of racial
criteria unjust? Blake then argues that what is objectionable about this form of selection
is that it also significantly negatively impacts the state’s own citizens:
7It should be noted that they at length discuss the normative validity of treating people differently when they have
been allowed into the territory. While Miller opens up for somewhat more differentiated treatment than Carens, they
both agree that people who have stayed for a prolonged period of time should be allowed citizenship.
8Some also argue that even though one does not have special obligations to economic migrants, states still need to
treat them fairly according to some less weighty obligations. For example, Miller argues that racial discrimination is
insulting to those seeking admittance (Miller 2014, 374). Blake argues elsewhere that one has a moral duty to give
economic migrants reasons they cannot reasonably object to (Blake 2008).
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Racially conscious immigration is of moral importance, in this instance, more for what it
says to those already present than for what it says to prospective immigrants. If we
examine the message of a racially discriminatory pattern of immigration, we might under-
stand it as a public announcement of racial favouritism. This can be understood as deeply
problematic even if the interests and rights of the immigrants are taken off the table. The
state making a statement of racial preference in immigration necessarily makes a statement
of racial preference domestically as well. (Blake 2002, 284)
So, according to this argument, what makes racial selection objectionable in immigra-
tion policies, is that the state by enacting such restrictions makes a statement of
preference, which negatively impacts those in the domestic population who happen
to share this identification.
Blake argues that racial selection has two kinds of negative impact on the population.
Firstly, he refers to Rawls’ description of: ‘the social bases of self respect. A state which
articulated a message that one racial group is to be preferred over another in immigra-
tion makes a public statement; this statement undermines the ability of citizens with the
disfavoured racial identity to see themselves as full participants in the project of self-
rule’ (Blake 2002, 284). So, racial selection impacts the agency and self-respect of people
who share this group identity. According to Rawls self-respect is fundamental to our
valuing ourselves as individuals, something we need in order to be pursue our own
ideas of the good and to contribute in society as citizens. Furthermore, this self-respect
is reliant on others respecting us, and fair treatment by institutional structures. Rawls
describes the social bases of self-respect in the following way: ‘these bases are those
aspects of basic institutions normally essential if citizens are to have a lively sense of
their own worth as persons and to be able to develop and exercise their moral powers
and to advance their aims and ends with self-confidence’ (Rawls 2005, 308–09). While
there is much disagreement within political philosophy on how to conceptualize self-
respect and which social structures that best support it, most agree that it is important
to foster, and that fair treatment by institutional structures and social interactions foster
it. So, in relation to racial selection, Blake is plausibly claiming that this practice affects
people’s sense of their own worth, and thereby restricts their ability to exercise their
agency as citizens in modern democracies.
Secondly, Blake argues that racial selection also has practical implications for citi-
zens, more specifically as a kind of gerrymandering of the population: ‘It is one thing,
we might think, for a certain ethnic group to tend to find itself in the minority in
electoral politics. It is quite another for a state agency to seek to alter the electoral
landscape so that this minority status is guaranteed to continue’ (Blake 2002, 285).
Indeed, controlling demographics has historically been the primary goal of racist
immigration policies. The Australian Immigration Restriction Act of 1901, part of the
White Australia Policy, the British Aliens Act of 1905, and the US immigration Acts of
1917 and 1924, were all aimed at keeping unwanted ethnicities and races out.9 In short
then, Blake argues that racial selection in immigration policies affects both the self-
respect of the discriminated groups domestically, and allows the majority population to
politically cement its power.
9For an overview of the relationship between immigration regulations and racist discrimination, see Fine (2016,
125–50).
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Now, one might question whether the same argument would hold if the racial group
which is being selected is a minority. Would ‘positive discrimination’ of racial minorities in
immigration regulations be morally problematic in the same way? While this is not the
place to dwell on this question, such a policy could intuitively affect the social bases of self-
respect of other non-selected groups. Yet, as the groups affected are not already disadvan-
taged the effect does not seem as morally problematic, and it furthermore would not seem
to contribute to anymajority cementing its power. One can also be critical of an underlying
assumption relating to the second factor of power cementation here, namely that Blake
seems to assume that ethnic groups vote as a block and share the same political preferences,
as this varies from country to country. Perhaps if we expand Blake’s second point to also
include power entrenchment of demographic groups, not merely in elections, but also in
wealth and resources, the argument holds even more force. I will consider this in more
detail in the next section when comparing racial selection to skills-based selection.
Blake also argues that racial immigration policies are likely to be more unjust the
more multicultural a society is. Furthermore, he points out that as there in a racially
homogenous society would be no minority population to be adversely affected, it would
not in principle be objectionable with such policies, but that no such homogenous
society exists and these policies are therefore always objectionable.10
Blake is not alone in grounding the objection to racial selection on effects to
domestic population. In a similar manner, Altman and Wellman argue that racial
criteria are morally wrong as they constitute disrespecting citizens who happen to be
part of the same racial group. ‘[It] is not difficult to see how Asian Australians, for
instance, would be disrespected by an immigration policy banning entry to non-whites
because they were regarded as inferior to whites. Even though this policy in and of itself
in no way threatens Asians with expulsion, it sends a clear message that, qua Asians,
they are not regarded with equal concern and respect by their fellow white citizens’
(Altman and Wellman 2011, 187). As we can see, the moral basis for the wrongness
according to Altman and Wellman is also an injury to some of the already residing
citizens’ self-respect.
There also seems to be some empirical support in psychological research for these
philosophical kinds of arguments against racial selection. As Hue et al. (Huo et al. 2018)
have found, immigration policies also send a statement to domestic citizens, which has
a measurable impact on their sense of belonging: ‘Subnational immigrant policies (i.e.
those instituted at the state level in the USA) are not only key to successful integration,
they send a message about who belongs. Our evidence suggests that welcoming state-
level immigrant policies lead to greater belonging among foreign-born Latinos, US-
born Latinos, and even US-born whites’ (Huo et al. 2018, 954). As such, there seems to
be good reason to believe that Blake’s argument concerning the negative impact on
domestic citizens is correct, and that this can plausibly impact the social bases of self-
respect. However, Blake does not believe the same holds for skills-based selection.
In the article Immigration and Political Equality from 2008, Blake argues that
selection based on ‘economic success’, as opposed to racial selection, is legitimate: ‘It
is difficult to regard this as objectionable from the standpoint of social justice – bearing
10Blake does consider that an exception might be made for ethnic groups who have been made particularly vulnerable,
and gives the example of Israel. (Blake 2002, 286).
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in mind […] that we are discussing here only individuals with no individual right to
status as immigrant. […] The moral equality of persons, after all, requires us to give
reasons to people that they could not reasonably reject; it rules out reasons that demand
the moral denigration of some segment of the population in question’ (Blake 2008,
972). But is Blake correct in making this distinction? Might not skills-based selection
also amount to moral denigration?
Skills-based selection revisited
Statements of preference on skills
Now let us consider the case of skills-based selection, and whether it is vulnerable to the
same criticisms as Blake’s arguments against race-based selection. A certain group is
being rejected at the border or allowed in on worse terms, people belonging to the same
group are also citizens of this state, and by publicly announcing this group as less
favourable or unfavourable the state is also sending a signal to its domestic population.
As mentioned previously Blake states that: ‘The state making a statement of racial
preference in immigration necessarily makes a statement of racial preference domes-
tically as well’ (Blake 2002, 284). Now, does this also apply in relation to skills-based
selection, and if so, how does it affect the citizens? I will first consider the argument
concerning the social bases of self-respect, before moving onto the practical effects the
selection might have for the population.
On the face of it, we seem to be faced with a similar type of restriction. A group is
being selected for admission, while others who do not match these criteria are being
kept out. As previously mentioned, skills-based selection typically grants wealthy and
high-skilled individuals easier entry, while keeping out, or allowing in on worse terms,
the less educated, less healthy and less wealthy, often referred to as working-class and
lower-class people. Moreover, no state is homogenous enough in the skill-levels of its
citizens and class distribution that it does not have citizens of all skill levels and classes.
As such the state is selecting a group of people at the border, and sending out a signal,
implicitly through public policy and sometimes explicitly through public statements,
that people without specific skills, education or wealth are unwanted. It is important to
clarify that a problematic message can be sent and received, whether or not it is
intended to be sent. By giving fewer rights and conditional residence status to the less-
skilled, the state is concretely manifesting the lower value it places on some skills. And
while states frequently reward people with different skills differently, through for
example wages and employment, it would seem to contravene a liberal understanding
of equality to give differentiated citizenship rights on the basis of the citizens’ skillsets.
Furthermore, in response to countries enacting these kinds of immigration regulations,
some researchers and politicians have pointed out how they contradict central political
values.
With regards to Canada’s selective skills regime, Harald Bauder stated that: ‘In the
statistical exercise, the newly proposed selection guidelines were matched with data
from the 1996 census to examine how many Canadians would actually qualify to
immigrate to Canada as skilled workers. The results indicate the vast majority of
Canadians are not good enough for Canada’ (Bauder 2001, 1). While Bauder primarily
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believes these types of regulations are unfair due to their effects on the migrants, and
the countries they are moving from due to a ‘brain drain’, he also points out that these
kinds of regulations seem ‘[…]to contradict Canadians’ keen sense for justice, equality
and democracy’ (Bauder 2001, 2). As such, the regulations seem to contradict what
many Canadians think of as central political values, and by having an impact on their
views of fairness and equality, one could argue they affects Canadians’ social bases for
self-respect. For if everyone is not viewed equally as citizens, they are not equally able to
develop the self-respect needed to participate in self-rule.
Skills-based selection has also long been a contentious issue in US politics. When
immigration reform was discussed in the run up to the 2008 presidential elections, then
Senator Barack Obama stated: ‘How many of our forefathers would have measured up
under the point system? How many would have been turned back at Ellis Island?’
(Obama 2007, 6512). Obama’s statement was made in relation to proposals that the US
go from a system where most immigrants were being granted entry based on family
reunification and marginally through the green card lottery and refugee status, to more
of a skills-based system as in Canada. Now, while his emphasis was primarily on
fairness to the immigrants seeking admittance, he also points out what this kind of
migration might do to the US itself, referring to the points-based system as a ‘radical
experiment in social engineering’ (Obama 2007, 6512). In other words, he raised
concerns about what kind of society the US would become by employing such policies
and questioned the underlying fairness of such policies.
So, in both the US and Canada, critics have claimed that these policies contradict
central political values, but what kind of message is being sent and might it also impact
their own citizens? Yolande Pottie-Sherman has used a critical discourse analysis to
analyse the US migration debate. As she puts it: ‘Admission policies (both permanent
and temporary) embody conceptions of who belongs within the borders of the nation’
(Pottie-Sherman 2013, 559). According to Pottie-Sherman, rather than merely being
a practical device to choose desirable immigrants, these regulations also show
a preference for what kinds of citizen a state wants. And while there will always be
diverse opinions on migrants amongst citizens of a state, immigration control is
a concrete manifestation of state’s preferences. Consequently, there seems to be good
reason to assume that a state employing skills-based selection is sending a message of
preference to its own citizens.
It also needs to be added that skills-based selection sometimes works as a proxy. For
even though proponents will argue that skills-based regulations are fair, objective and
transparent, these kinds of immigration regulations in practice tend to disproportio-
nately favour some groups over others. As Tannock has described in the Canadian case:
‘[…] education-based discrimination in Canadian immigration policy should be chal-
lenged not only because as many of the critics have recognized previously, education
very often serves as a proxy whether intentional or not, for other forms of discrimina-
tion based on race, class, gender, or national origin’ (Tannock 2011, 1332). So, even
though many countries in the global North have changed their previous racial restric-
tions, their immigration regulations could tend to favour the same groups. In a similar
manner and in relation to the US debate, Pottie-Sherman mentions how: ‘The points
system, because of its certain uneven racial bias against Latinos and other immigrants
from the global South, became a veiled way of talking about race (as well as class) and
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immigration policy’ (Pottie-Sherman 2013, 572). In both these cases, it looks like in
addition to sending a message that the unskilled are less-wanted, skills-based migration
in practise discriminates against the same groups that were previously subject to racial
restrictions.11 Therefore, unless this proxy effect is remedied, skills-based restrictions
can still be perceived as racial, and Blake’s argument could hold more directly. As such,
any country implementing skills-based selection needs to consider whether their selec-
tions might still work as a proxy for selecting on other clearly impermissible grounds,
such as race, religion and gender.12
In sum, there does seem to be good reason to think that the state, in practising skills-
based selection, can be perceived to be sending a message to the domestic population;
a message about who is wanted and who is not. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that
the message about undesirability is received by state’s own citizens, whether or not they
are the intended recipients of the message. However, as opposed to racial selection
criteria, these policies are not usually taken to be normatively problematic. Why might
this be the case? Let us consider three possible reasons why skills-based selection might
not have similar effects on the social bases of self-respect: firstly, that the groups in
question do not have as strong an in-group identity, secondly, that citizens believe the
state is pursuing its legitimate goals through this selection and that they therefore are
not the intended recipients of this statement of preference, and thirdly, that many
citizens believe immigration in general is bad for their prospects on the job market.
Firstly, we are obviously considering distinctly different kinds of groups. Most
people, at least at present, seem to identify more with people of their own nationality
and race, than people from other countries who might share their skill levels, social
class and their level of wealth. Therefore, although a public announcement of skills
favouritism could in principle have the same effect on the social bases of self-respect as
public announcement of racial favouritism, in practice it might have less of an effect.
Furthermore, the history of immigration restrictions is also interwoven with racism, as
most of the early immigration restrictions were instituted to limit the arrival of
unwanted ethnic and racial groups. These same groups were also subject to racist
policies inside the countries instituting these restrictions. Therefore, there has long
been an awareness of the interplay with racial restrictions in immigration, and internal
mistreatment of these same groups. As such, the relative novelty of skills-based selec-
tion criteria could plausibly indicate less of an impact on the domestic populations’ self-
respect. However, this could be subject to change over time as more states institute such
11For more information on the relationship between immigration restrictions and racial injustice, see Fine (2016,
125–50).
12In the article ‘Immigration and Political Equality’, Blake addresses the issue of the proxy effect to skills-based
migration (Blake 2008, 973–74). He uses the example of gender imbalance in education, and argues that if
women in general are less educated, skills-based migration criteria would seem to give preference to men. Blake
holds that this would be particularly unfair if the reasons for underdevelopment in the origin state have in any way
been caused by the receiving state. However, he contends that this is not enough to deem skills-based criteria
morally unfair, as firstly, it is difficult to identify who is responsible for underdevelopment, and secondly, this
unfairness gives rise to other duties of assistance, rather than changes in migration systems. I do not think this
response is successful, as I do not believe one needs a clear causal link to identify responsibility, and since other
duties of assistance are not being met today. However, these issues are clearly beyond the scope of this paper, and
what is important to note for our present purpose is that Blake’s underlying moral reasoning here is based on how
one is treating prospective migrants, and that one needs to give prospective immigrants reasons they cannot
reasonably object to. In other words, the argument and response does not address the issue of any proxy effect skills-
based selection might have on the social bases of self-respect for the domestic population.
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restrictions, and the consciousness around the mode of selection increases. And while
the degree of class identification differs from country to country, evidence suggests that
it increases with the degree of economic inequality (Andersen and Curtis 2012), so the
more unequal a society becomes the larger the effect on self-respect could become.
Furthermore, as skills-based evaluations are increasingly being used on other migrant
streams (Ellermann 2019), the awareness of these restrictions, and consequently their
impact on self-respect, is likely to increase.
Secondly, while racial selection cannot claim to contribute towards the legitimate
policy aims of a state, skills-based selection can arguably do just that, as amongst others
Blake (2008) and Miller (2016, 105–06) have pointed out. So, while racial selection can
only point to some rather ethnocentric or racist claims as reasons for this kind of
selection, states can argue that skills-based selections are made on the basis of the
benefit to the wellbeing of their own citizens. In a similar manner to a job interview,
they are getting the best people for the task at hand, namely filling gaps in their labour
market. This could lead citizens to realizing that they are not the intended receiver of
this statement of preference. However, it is difficult to see how the state can make this
statement of preference without any domestic recipients who share the same skill-sets
also identifying with it. In short, the fact that states argue that they need some people
and not others, while true, might at the same time hurt some of their citizens’ self-
respect. It is not as if many states are refusing entry to lower-skilled and unskilled
people; they are often letting them in, but on different terms, thereby concretely
manifesting their evaluations of various people’s worth. It should be noted that some
skills-based selection are being made on federal levels, such as in Australia or Canada,
and this could also affect both the message being sent, and how it is perceived. If the
local selections vary considerably, they are less likely to be perceived as a clear statement
of preference. Furthermore, the local citizens are more likely to see the selection as
justified if they address specific skills shortages in the area.
Thirdly, the view one has of skills-based selection will also be based on the perceived
effect it might have on one’s livelihood. As Mavroudi and Nagel have pointed out:
‘Whether one views migration in positive or negative terms, it seems, hinges on the
position one occupies in the labour market and in social hierarchies’ (Mavroudi and
Nagel 2016, 82). So, if one thinks one’s job is likely to be threatened and is suffering
from economic anxiety, it is likely that one will be sceptical to a large influx of workers.
Hainmueller et al. have showed that workers in the US are not more sceptical to
immigrants with their own skill-sets. Indeed, they found that all workers in general
were more positive to high-skilled than low-skilled immigration (Hainmueller, Hiscox,
and Margalit 2015, 205). Furthermore, there is evidence, at least in the case of the US,
that low-skilled citizens are more sceptical of economic immigration in general, and
that the more skilled someone is the less sceptical they are (Hainmueller and Hiscox
2010, 79). In short, many working-class people are sceptical of immigration, as it is
frequently argued that migrants have undercut and put pressure on wages. And whether
or not this is actually the case, it is clear that a commonly held assumption that this is
the case will have an impact on the ways in which skills-based selection affects people’s
self-respect. In sum, although skills-based selection intuitively would seem to have an
effect on the social bases of self-respect, there are other overriding concerns that
diminish the effect of such policies. Furthermore, the complicated nature, diversity
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and relative novelty of skills-based selection criteria might also diminish the effects of
the message, as opposed to the clear and transparent message of racist immigration
criteria.
Practical effects: power entrenchment and educational opportunities
The second effect Blake argues racial selection has on domestic population are the
practical effects, more specifically that it alters the demographics of the population by
allowing the majority population to cement its numerical advantage by granting
members of their own group entry, while other groups are stopped at the border. As
mentioned above, Blake seems to be making the assumption that racial selection is
made on behalf of a majority and that members of racial groups share political interests,
which while historically often the case, will vary between historical and societal settings.
In the case of skills-based selection, the situation is even more complex. As previously
mentioned, countries often give high-skilled people more rights and easier tracks to
citizenship, while less-skilled individuals are given temporary residency and fewer
rights. Furthermore, whether high-skilled migrants will contribute to a kind of cement-
ing of political power is questionable, after all why should we assume that they share the
same views? For although wealth and earnings are often an indicator of how one votes
and attempts to influence the political process, they are far from the only ones.
It seems difficult to be certain concerning the precise effects of skills-based selection on
political power entrenchment, yet skills-based selection has other practical effects on domestic
citizens, primarily in relation to education and the labour market. While many have argued
that an influx of people with particular skillsets can have a depreciative effect on wages in
certain sectors – this is frequently an argument put forward against low-skilledmigrants – the
effects of skills-based immigration on public education has been less appreciated. As
Mavroudi and Nagel ask: ‘To what extent do skilled migration programmes allow govern-
ments and businesses to ignore the training and educational of national labour forces?’
(Mavroudi andNagel 2016, 82)While the long-term effects of skills-based selection on public
education have yet to be revealed, it is clear that it can alter the needs of a government to
spend funds on training their domestic population. As Tannock has recognized in the
Canadian case: ‘[…] we need to recognise immigration policy as constituting another
potential mechanism for the privatisation of public education as well’ (Tannock 2011,
1340). This seems intuitively plausible, for if it is cheaper to attract a nurse from the
Philippines or a doctor from Ethiopia than to educate a young citizen, there seems to be an
incentive for the state to prioritize the former over the latter. In short, the influx of high-
skilled migrants could lead to fewer opportunities for advancement for citizens in general,
and this should be considered by anyone advocating skills-based selection. It should be
emphasized that while I have not found any empirical evidence that this has been proven, the
concern does seems reasonable. Shachar describes the issue in the following way:
“The basic concern is that if the world’s best and brightest can be “imported” at will, with
government’s fast tracking admission to those they covet on the basis of an expected
return – material, reputation, or otherwise – we might see decreased attention paid to the
kind of persistent, long-term investment that is required in order to build up a creative and
professional workforce to meet the challenges of the knowledge economy in the twenty-
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first century and to cultivate home-grown talent in arts, athletics, sciences, and the like”
(Shachar 2016, 194).
Consequently, some states which receive many skilled migrants, such as Singapore and
Hong Kong, have already put policies in place in order to assuage such concerns among
their citizens (Shachar 2016, 194). There are also ongoing discussions in the US to tax
employers of skilled migrants in particular STEM sectors (science, technology, engi-
neering, and mathematics), and use these funds to educate the domestic population in
similar degrees. These policies constitute concrete examples of how states are attempt-
ing to remedy the appearance of unfairness in giving high-skilled jobs to foreign
citizens, and thereby prioritizing integrating them before educating their own
population.
In sum, how can we evaluate whether the effects of skills-based selection on the
domestic population should make us limit or alter these practices due to considerations
of fairness? Well, it might be normatively problematic to different degrees. Firstly, one
might ask whether skills-based selection is wrong in all cases due to the kind of negative
effects it has on the domestic population. Based on the above discussion, I cannot
conclude decisively on this. Secondly, one can contend that these negative effects need
to be part of a utilitarian calculus, and that when calculating the permissibility of skills-
based selection one needs to consider the effects discussed in this paper. I believe the
latter to be the case, and that a normative evaluation of skills-based selection should
take into account the negative effects, as well as the gains, brought about by such
migration; in particular in relation to any effects on the self-respect of citizens in the
society the migrants are moving to, and any power entrenchment that might come
about as a result. If the society in general benefits from skills-based selection, and in
particular the less skilled and unskilled people in that society, it would seem like a more
compelling case can be made for it than if merely a segment of society or particular
industry benefits.
Conclusion
The ideals of citizenship are continually being re-examined and redefined by states in
various ways. One of the ways in which this is done is at the border, where states decide who
is wanted, and who is not. The effects of skills-based selection on countries, not just for the
migrants and the countries these migrants are leaving, needs to be considered when
evaluating the fairness of such policies. Rather than being merely a neutral framework
for deciding who is allowed in, skills-based selection makes a statement regarding the kind
of citizen a state wants. And while this selection is not as problematic for the formation of
self-respect as selection based on race, some negative impacts are clearly discernible. In
addition to potentially influencing the formation of self-respect, skills-based selection has
practical effects on the population in the short term, and its effects in the long term are
uncertain and affected by many other governmental policies. It also seems likely that skills-
based selection might have a detrimental effect on the funding of public education. As the
effects of such policies have yet to reveal themselves, it is worth being mindful of how
differentiated treatment of migrants on the basis of skills, with respect to rights and
opportunities, impacts treatment of citizens already residing in a state. These effects should
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be considered in any normative evaluation by states before instituting, or increasing the use
of, skills-based immigration systems.
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